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Abstract
We analyze the effects of political business cycles and fiscal decentralization on the ex-
penditure categories of Polish municipalities. We find convincing evidence for strong political
business cycles in almost all expenditure categories, and in particular for the categories of
expenditure relevant for electoral success such as infrastructure and social expenditure. We
find evidence that transfers to the municipalities increase the size of the electoral cycle.
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1. Introduction
This work analyzes political budget cycles in local expenditure of Polish municipalities.
Local budget cycles have been subject to interest of researchers throughout recent years and
this work adds to the existing literature in several ways. First of all, this is a first work
that looks at the topic of political budget cycles for a newly established democracy. As will
be further described in the literature review, current research has focused mainly on the
established Western European democracies. Additionally, most of the works concentrate on
federalist states as opposed to a fairly centralized, unitary country such as Poland, in which
municipalities heavily rely on the block grants allocated by the central government.
The main focus of this work is the interrelation between the level of transfers from the
central government and the strength of the political budget cycle. The problem of common
resource nature of transfers into local entities has been identified in the literature. An impor-
tant literature in this vein examines the possibility that representatives will seek to externalize
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the costs of government expenditures in their jurisdiction onto citizens of other communities,
turning public revenue into a common pool that is quickly overfished (see e.g. Buchanan, 1977;
Weingast et al., 1981; Rodden, 2003). The electoral incentives of the mayors, combined with
the constraints of legislative institutions, might lead them to tax and spend more or less than
the median voter would prefer. As a consequence of the incongruence between spending and
taxation that arises when geographically targeted expenditures are funded with general tax-
ation, representatives misperceive the costs of spending and demand an ”excessive” amount,
because they take into account all of the benefits but only consider the share of taxes that
falls on their constituents. This might lead to spending that exceeds the socially optimal
amount. According to Wagner and Buchanan (1977), a further problem is that voters do
not fully understand the relationship between current deficits and future taxes – they simply
reward spending and punish taxation. Politicians with electoral motivations face incentives
to take advantage of their ”fiscally illuded” voters with excessive deficit-financed spending,
especially in the election years.
Extensive theoretical and empirical literature tries to answer the question whether fiscal
autonomy decreases the size of the public sector. While most argue that fiscal autonomy leads
to a decrease in the public expenditure, some strands of the literature identify the opposite
possibility. There are some theoretical arguments for why centrally allocated grants might
in fact reduce the size of the local public sector. As argumented by Oates (1990), when the
sub-national provision of services has cross-boundary or spillover effects, sub-national decision
making may not lead to the optimal nationwide provision of services. If that is the case, the
central government could affect sub-national provision by subsidizing the services. Moreover,
whenever economies of scale are an important factor, centrally allocated grants could, in fact
lead to efficiency improvements. As observed by Bergvall et al. (2006), if financing grants
are given for imposed programmes or minimum standards, like those for basic sub-national
services in the form of non-earmarked grants (general purpose or block grants), best incentives
for subnational jurisdictions to seek opportunities for cost savings are created.
Our main results show that the relationship between the transfers to the municipalities in
Poland and the level of local expenditure might be negative. We link this finding to the fact
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that the municipalities, due to relying on property management revenues, need to compete
in service provision instead of taxes. The size of the electoral cycle, on the other hand, is
positively related to the fraction of the local budget transferred from the central government.
Additionally we show that the budget cycles have different shape for different categories of
local expenditure. With our results we contribute to the discussion of the effects of fiscal
decentralization on the size of the public sector.
In the next subsection we briefly describe the institutional and political setting of Polish
municipalities. In Section 2 we present an overview of literature on municipal expenditure
and political budget cycles. Section 3 contains description of the dataset as well as the main
hypotheses. Section 4 presents the results and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
1.1. Institutional background
Municipalities (Polish: ”gmina”) are principal units of administrative division in Poland.
There are currently 2478 municipalities of size varying between 1400 and 1700000 inhabitants,
out of which 908 are cities. The legislative and controlling body of each gmina is the elected
municipal council (rada gminy), or in a town: rada miasta (town council). Executive power
is held by the directly elected mayor of the municipality. Since 2002 mayors are elected in a
direct way in a first–past–the–post set–up. The municipal council is elected in a proportional
election and the number of seats depends on the size of the municipality. It is important to
notice that election timing is entirely exogenous and with the exception of very rare cases of
replacement elections (e.g. in the case of deaths or appeal of mayors) cannot be manipulated
at the local level. This setting makes the electoral cycle variable entirely exogenous and
simplifies the methodology of the analysis.
Municipalities fulfill two types of tasks: own tasks and commissioned tasks. Own tasks
serve to satisfy the needs of the community, which include e.g. local infrastructure manage-
ment, waste removal, public transport, health care, public education, environmental protec-
tion, social support and cultural facilities. Commissioned tasks typically include organization
of elections and some public administration tasks such as registration of civil affairs and
migration recording. However, some of the own tasks are strictly regulated by law and the
central government’s decisions, and municipalities do not have much freedom managing them,
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e.g. education or social support. It does not mean that municipalities cannot exhibit their
own initiative in fulfillment of these tasks, but this usually concerns wealthier units. Poorer
units restrict themselves to what they are required to do by the law, using transfers they
receive for this purpose from the central government.
Municipalities in Poland dispose of five major sources of financing: subventions from the
central government, designated subsidies, participation in the income and corporate taxes,
local taxation and management of municipal property. Municipalities’ degree of freedom in
income raising differs for diverse categories of financing. For the first three categories there
is virtually no financial independence whatsoever. Municipalities have power only over two
latter categories, and in particular when it comes to management of municipal properties.
With respect to local taxes they have very limited autonomy, although local taxes such as
property taxes have a substantially lower impact on the income of the municipalities than
the possibility of selling of the local property (Hausner, 2013). Subventions and designated
subsidies are mostly transferred as formula based non-earmarked grants: in year 2004, 24.1%
of total grants were earmarked formula-based current grants, 5.4% earmarked formula-based
capital grants and the remaining 70.5% were general-purpose formula-based non-earmarked
grants(Bergvall et al., 2006).
Intergovernmental transfers constituted in 2013 on average 62% of municipalities’ revenue,
whereas maximum values reach in some cases even 90%. Figure 1.1 additionally shows that
the share of transfers in the overall revenues of municipalities has been slowly but constantly
increasing in the analyzed period. This process is due on one hand to continued decentraliza-
tion, with the central government transferring its tasks to the lower level of administration
together with resources allowing local governments to fulfill these functions. On the other
hand, due to the economic crisis and lowering of income taxes the own revenues of municipal-
ities are decreasing. We also observe that the share of transfers is a great source of variation
in our dataset taking values between 20% and 90% percent of the overall revenue. In general
we may assume that in smaller and poorer municipalities the share of transfers in municipal
revenues was higher than in bigger and richer ones. However, due to the transfers from the
central government, the smallest units have often very high revenues per capita (maa, 2013).
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Thus, we may treat the information about high share of transfers as a signal that a particular
municipality is relatively poor.
Figure 1: Share of intergovernmental transfers in the overall revenue of municipalities
Source: own calculations based on Local Data Bank of Polish Statistical Office
The mayor bears executive power in a municipality. According to Art. 30 of the Municipal
Self-Governance Act mayor’s tasks include: preparation of draft resolutions of the municipal
council, specification of how to implement the resolutions, management of municipal property
and implementation of the budget. The two latter competencies give the mayor a relevant
power over local finances of the municipalities, as management of municipal property is a
substantial source of revenue of the municipalities. This category of income is also the one
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which is fairly easily manipulated on the local level. Moreover competence of implementing
the budget as well as preparation of local resolutions also gives a substantial power over
expenditure to the hands of the mayor. In principle, municipalities are obliged to run a
balanced budget, however, Art. 242 of the Public Finances Act allows for municipalities to
run short–term deficits financed mostly from past budget surpluses and surpluses on current
accounts.
In summary, the institutional setting of Polish municipalities reveals a clear pattern:
most of the tasks and therefore most of the expenditure is decentralized whereas the main
source of income are centrally allocated subventions. This combination of factors creates an
above–mentioned ”common–resource problem” and a strong incentive for local governments
to extend their expenditure levels, in a possibly inefficient way. Additionally, competencies
of the mayor are set in a way, that makes it fairly easy to involve in budget manipulations
before elections. We expect the latter problem to be more severe along with increasing role
of central funding in municipality’s revenue.
2. Evidence of electoral cycles at the local level and evidence for partisan effects
The existence of opportunistic budget cycles was empirically tested both at the national
level (Alesina and Roubini, 1992; Alt and Lassen, 2006; Klomp and De Haan, 2013) and for
the lower levels of government (see e.g. Galli and Rossi, 2002; Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya,
2004; Veiga and Veiga, 2007; Schneider, 2010; Werck et al., 2008). The obtained results
are, however, mixed. In a number of studies, the existence of pre-electoral fiscal cycles was
confirmed at the local level, particularly evident in an increase of total expenditure and budget
deficit (Galli and Rossi, 2002; Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004; Veiga and Veiga, 2007) as
well as a decline in public debt (Jochimsen and Nuscheler, 2011). Some other researchers,
however, do not find the political factors to be important in shaping the level of municipal
public expenses.
It was empirically additionally shown that the occurrence of political budget cycles may
depend on numerous factors such as the level of country’s development and democracy, polit-
ical system or government transparency (Alt and Lassen, 2006; Klomp and De Haan, 2013).
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In this study, we analyze one other institutional arrangement: the level of central transfers,
which in turn reflect the strength of the common pool problem arising from the dependence
of local governments on central funding.
Veiga and Veiga (2007) utilize the panel of observations for Portuguese municipalities over
the years 1979-2000 to test for the existence of rational political business cycles. Using the
GMM estimator, the authors run a number of linear dynamic panel data models which vary
with respect to the dependent variable. More specifically, they use either the budget balance,
real total expenditures, the capital expenditures or the investment expenditures (all expressed
in the real terms, per capita). The set of explanatory variables include, among others, the
lagged values of the explained variables, total (or capital) transfers received per capita, a
dummy corresponding to the election year to control for the electoral cycles, dummies related
to the mayor’s ideology and the geographic location of a municipality and, finally, population
density and age structure. A clear evidence of mayors’ opportunistic behavior was found,
meaning there is a sign of pre-election increases in expenditures for items such as overpasses,
streets or rural roads that are highly visible to the society. What this implies is that in view of
the upcoming elections, incumbent governments tend to manipulate fiscal policy instruments
to ensure they will keep their office. Moreover, the ideology appears to affect the spending
choices, namely left-wing oriented mayors tend to behave in a far more opportunistic way
before the municipal elections period. Nevertheless, the fact that the mayor’s party has a
majority of deputies in the municipal assembly (as an indicator of one’s support) or that the
incumbent is running for another term in office do not seem to have any impact on the spending
patterns. Additionally, factors such as transfers or the location along the coastline contribute
to higher expenditures, while smaller population and high share of the population under 15
tend to decrease them. Budget balance, in turn, is positively affected by the percentage of
youngsters but falls with an increase in the share of elderly people in the population.
Furdas et al. (2015) analyze German cities and find an increase in local spending and de-
crease in tax revenues before elections. Moreover, the study revealed that the electoral cycles
are observed mainly in the visible categories of expenditure. Authors observe an increase
in building investments, accompanied by increasing intergovernmental grants for investment
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purposes but also a halt in the increase of local tax rates. The extent of these political bud-
get cycles is more pronounced in municipalities that are politically aligned with the state
governments and are politically more contested. It is worth mentioning that social support
spending is not manipulated at the local level. Similarly, Hayo and Neumeier (2012) for Ger-
man La¨nder find no evidence of political cycles in the case of expenditures on social support,
public safety, fire protection as well as public administration. Moreover, the composition of
public expenditure is affected by the socioeconomic status of an incumbent: lower-class prime
ministers spend more on public safety, education, R&D, social security, infrastructure and
health. Weak governments (coalition governments and minority governments) spend less on
public administration, public safety, and health, but more on social security.
There is mixed evidence on political cycles for other categories of expenditure. Castro
and Martins (2014) finds that expenditure components that increased during election periods
tend to be related to highly visible items such as general public services, social protection and
health care, while defense and economic affairs are the biggest losers in election years. For the
case of Italian cities, Dalle Nogare and Galizzi (2011) find a peculiar electoral cycle: mayors
spend less on culture just before the elections. On the other hand, Benito et al. (2013) report
that Spanish mayors increase the culture expenditures in the election year and reduce it in
the second year after. The magnitude of the electoral cycle is influenced by mayor’s political
ideology rather than political strength and re-election willingness. Finally, Veiga and Veiga
(2007) report that for Portuguese municipalities in pre-electoral periods there is an increase
in expenditure on items such as roads and street construction (public infrastructure).
Theoretically, left–wing politicians are expected to support spending increases, while the
right–wing parties rather prefer deficit reductions (Hibbs, 1977) and are more concerned about
decreasing the expenses after the elections (Castro and Martins, 2014). Some of the empirical
studies investigating this phenomenon confirm the importance of a ruling party’s ideology for
the size and composition of public spending (see e.g. Getzner, 2004; Mink and De Haan, 2006;
Potrafke, 2011), while others find no evidence of a partisan effect (Potrafke, 2010; Jochimsen
and Nuscheler, 2011). We further analyze the puzzling discrepancy in our work.
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3. Data, methodology and hypotheses
Our data comprises information about 307 municipalities with population over 1000 in-
habitants for the period 2002 to 2013, which includes three periods in office and, thus three
electoral cycles. A total number of observations is 3664.
Economic and demographic variables have been collected from the Local Data Bank of
Polish Statistical Office and the Polish Ministry of Finance. Electoral and political data as
well as education level of the mayors has been collected from the records of the Electoral
Commission as well official websites of the local political parties and in certain cases from
press releases.
The empirical analysis deals with the total expenditure of the municipalities. The esti-
mated equation is:
log(expenditure)it = β1log(revenue)it+β2transit+β3electionit+β4transit∗election+γXit+µt+νi+εit,
(1)
where Xit is the vector of controls, mut are the time effects and νi are the municipality
fixed effects. The dependent variables are natural logarithms of per capita total municipal
expenditure as well as categories of expenditures: healthcare, education, public administra-
tion, infrastructure, social protection and environmental protection. We have chosen these
categories, as we believe that these types of expenditure are mostly visible to the voters on
the local level.
In the baseline model we analyze the total expenditure controlling for the total revenue,
therefore the interpreation of this specification is basically the increase in the deficit financing.
For the models in which we look at the categories of expenditure, we can interpret the results
as a change in the composition of expenditure in the (pre)election years.
We do not differentiate between capital and current expenditure, yet although we expect
that the composition of capital vs. current expenditures will differ for different categories
of expenditure, the goal of this work is not to identify these differences, but to look at the
incentives of politicians to manipulate the views of the voters, who most likely do not recognize
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whether expenses are budgeted as of current or capital type.
As already mentioned in Section 2, correlation of the errors between the periods might
be a concern. In order to deal with this, as well as other methodological issues, which will
be described further on, we apply the System GMM method and estimate a dynamic panel.
The major problem in a study that analyses the expenditure levels is strong autocorrelation
of the dependent variable as well as of the revenues. Data additionally shows strong upward
trend throughout the sample, which needs to be accounted for (Figure 3). Due to these
issues, we believe that a dynamic panel approach is the correct methodology for this research.
Moreover, our panel is a typical case of small T and large N , for which the GMM method
performs better than other estimators. The number of lags included in each case has been
chosen according to the information criteria. For comparison purposes we also report the
results of FE estimations.
Figure 2: Total expenditure of a sample of randomly chosen municipalities
Source: own calculations based on Local Data Bank of Polish Statistical Office
Source: own calculations based on Local Data Bank of Polish Statistical Office
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Figure 3: Average Expenditure in Categories
As noted in the Introduction the main goal of this work is to look at the interrelation
between the political budget cycle and fiscal autonomy of municipalities. According to the
common pool hypothesis we expect the budget cycle to be stronger in municipalities that
are financed mostly from the central government subventions. The main variable of fiscal
autonomy is the ratio of revenues other than own revenues to overall revenues, denoted as
Transfers. This variable includes therefore sources of financing other than local taxation and
property management. This measure captures direct transfers from regional and national
government, subventions as well as direct subsidies from national and EU funds. EU funds
are included in this category, since it is an inflow of resources from outside a particular
minucipality, although they depend on municipality’s application and its own co-financing.
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We include party effects by adding mayor’s political affiliation as an independent variable.
There are four major parties in Poland as well as local committees. SLD (Democratic Left
Alliance) is a central–left party, PSL (Polish Peasants Party) is a typical center party, PO
(Civil Platform) is a conservative center–right whereas PiS (Law and Justice) has a left–
oriented economic program. Moreover, local committees represent a big share of locally elected
governments. In the regression a local committee is always a base value and party effects are
analyzed accordingly. It is important to mention that often local candidates officially enter
the election as independent politicians but are supported by one of the main parties. We have
included this fact while coding the dataset. Additionally we control for the vertical alignment
with the party (or a coalition) having the majority in the national parliament (SLD until
2005, PIS between 2005 and 2007 and PO ever since).
We include a dummy for higher education of the mayor to account for the results of Hayo
and Neumeier (2012) and additionally test whether education of the mayor has an effect on
the composition of the expenditure, whether for his own preferences or to reflect preferences
of the median voter who might be likely to elect an educated candidate if it corresponds to
the preferences of the community.
Finally, we include an incumbency variable, which takes a value 1 if a current mayor has
been elected in the previous electoral period. In fact, in 2010 in more than 90% of the mu-
nicipalities mayors fought for the next term in office and more than 60% accomplished this
objective. This variable may affect expenditure in two ways. On the one hand, incumbent
governor might need to spend less resources to guarantee his reelection. Additionally, conti-
nuity of governance might be associated with efficiency gains in expenditure. On the other
hand, a mayor who knows the local institutional and political environment can have easier
access to tools of budgetary manipulation and is additionally more likely to have support of
the local council in his actions. Depending on the strength of these effects, the sign of the
dummy variable will be different.
Apart from the political factors, public expenditure may also be determined by a vast
number of demographic, socioeconomic and geographic variables, therefore we include a set
of control variables of demographic and economic conditions. The standard set of explanatory
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variables utilized in most of the empirical studies includes the size and age structure of the
population as well as a measure of average income of the society. The impact of population
variables on the level of public spending cannot be easily predicted, though. For instance, the
size of the population may exhibit either a positive or negative effect, depending on whether
the demand for public goods, and hence also the expenses, grow faster or slower than the
population (Werck et al., 2008). In a number of works the negative relation between this
variable and the level of public spending in categories such as transport and communications,
health care, defense and communal services can be found (see e.g. Costa-Font and Moscone,
2009).
Population density, in turn, is supposed to reflect the degree of urbanization. This variable
plays an important role especially in shaping the level of infrastructure expenditure. It might
be the case that in more sparsely populated areas the demand for infrastructure is higher,
which translates into a negative effect of population density on public spending. On the other
hand, however, there exist also goods for which the demand is higher in the cities with higher
level of population density. Sanz et al. (2002) reveal a negative impact of population density
on transport and communications, defense and public services as well as positive effect in case
of social security spending.
As for the age structure of the society, the variables most often utilized in the analysis are
the percentage shares of the young and the elderly in the population. The purpose of including
them in the analysis is to test if these two groups of electors benefit over proportionately from
the provision of particular public goods, such as health care or education, in comparison to the
rest of citizens (Hayo and Neumeier, 2012). Veiga and Veiga (2007) for the case of Portuguese
municipalities reveal that higher share of the population under the age of 15 translates into
lower levels of total expenditures but at the same time tends to increase the spending on
infrastructure. Not surprisingly, the positive influence of the share of young population on
the level of public education expenses is often found (Sanz et al., 2002).
Another variable often employed in the studies covering the issue of public expenditure
determinants is the average or median level of income, which intends to capture the per capita
wealth of the community and may reflect the demand for public goods and services. Most of
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the researches confirm its positive influence on the level of spending both at the aggregated
level and for various categories of spending. In our study we use the share of revenue from
income taxation received by the municipality to proxy for the wealth of the members. The
municipalities do not raise the income tax, but receive back from the central budget the share
of the tax collected in this region.
Finally, many authors introduce the rate of unemployment in their models to control for
the economic situation of the entities as well as the ratio of public debt to total revenues as an
indicator of the local government’s budgetary situation. Additionally our study controls for
effects of metropolitan areas (municipalities with population higher than 500000 inhabitants),
the effect of the industrial region of Upper Silesia as well as potential effects of the financial
crisis of years 2009 and following. Summary statistics of the dependent and independent
variables are presented in Table 6 in the Appendix.
4. Results
Table 1 reports the results of the System GMM and FE estimation with and without the
interaction between the (pre)election years and fiscal autonomy as well as possiblity for a
nonlinear relationship between the level of transfers and expenditure levels. In the System
GMM estimation we have included up to two lags of the dependent variable to account for
the possibility that expenditures on long–run projects spillover to the next years.
Results presented in Table 1 show that there are some differences in the estimated param-
eters between GMM (Columns (1)–(4)) and FE estimations (Columns (5)–(8)). Specifically,
it can be noted that the FE results do not account for the fact that lagged dependent variable
is highly significant and there is a general upwards trend in expenditures in our sample, and
therefore these omitted variables lead to spurious coefficients in cases of lagged revenue and
crisis years dummy. These two coefficients reflect the autocorrelated structure of the errors
and cannot be interpreted straightforwardly. On the other hand, results presented in Columns
(1)–(3) do not show such inconsistencies, we will continue with interpretation of these results.
Grants from the central government are associated with decreased levels of municipal
expenditure. This result stays in opposition to the literature suggesting that fiscal autonomy
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Table 1: Total expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GMM GMM GMM GMM FE FE FE FE
L.Expenditure 0.35∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
(5.68) (5.65) (5.77) (5.84)
L2.Expenditure 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.63) (0.51) (0.65) (0.50)
Revenue 0.79∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗
(17.15) (17.21) (17.12) (16.96) (22.81) (22.88) (22.81) (23.55)
Lagged Revenue -0.14∗∗ -0.14∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(-2.49) (-2.42) (-2.60) (-2.59) (4.38) (4.30) (4.30) (4.42)
Transfers -0.39∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗ -0.11∗ -0.14∗∗ -0.10∗ 0.29
(-5.21) (-5.57) (-4.71) (2.16) (-1.96) (-2.33) (-1.66) (1.41)
PIT Revenue 0.28∗ 0.28∗ 0.27 0.24 -0.15 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15
(1.67) (1.73) (1.63) (1.43) (-1.23) (-1.23) (-1.27) (-1.19)
Public Debt 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
(11.07) (11.01) (10.97) (10.79) (8.93) (8.86) (8.91) (8.70)
EU Funds 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.36) (0.17) (0.45) (0.61) (-0.79) (-0.94) (-0.70) (-0.72)
1 Year Before 0.05∗∗∗ -0.02 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.01 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(9.18) (-0.70) (9.33) (8.56) (13.50) (-0.62) (13.59) (13.44)
Election Year 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(5.20) (5.23) (3.27) (5.03) (11.57) (11.63) (3.86) (11.55)
1 Year After -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗
(-6.96) (-7.00) (-7.04) (-6.96) (-2.15) (-2.08) (-2.20) (-2.15)
Crisis 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(5.36) (5.44) (5.57) (5.54) (7.90) (7.89) (7.88) (7.90)
Pop Density 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.52) (1.65) (1.57) (1.57) (1.40) (1.47) (1.41) (1.42)
Pop Under 18 0.32 0.27 0.28 0.38 -0.05 0.04 -0.06 0.02
(0.34) (0.30) (0.31) (0.41) (-0.14) (0.10) (-0.16) (0.04)
Pop Over 65 -1.44∗ -1.50∗ -1.45∗ -1.46∗ -0.65 -0.63 -0.66∗ -0.54
(-1.72) (-1.81) (-1.72) (-1.71) (-1.63) (-1.57) (-1.66) (-1.33)
Unemployment -0.32 -0.29 -0.31 -0.32 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16
(-1.35) (-1.19) (-1.28) (-1.34) (1.12) (1.20) (1.14) (1.15)
Turnout -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
(-0.46) (-0.13) (-0.19) (-0.63) (0.71) (0.82) (0.79) (0.80)
Education -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.38) (-0.27) (-0.28) (-0.45) (0.11) (0.18) (0.12) (0.10)
Incumbent 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.54) (0.56) (0.56) (0.50) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.30)
PO 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.41) (0.38) (0.38) (0.37) (1.34) (1.32) (1.34) (1.34)
PiS 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
(1.45) (1.42) (1.47) (1.34) (0.56) (0.52) (0.56) (0.60)
SLD -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-1.11) (-1.01) (-1.03) (-1.16) (0.14) (0.19) (0.17) (0.16)
PSL 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.56) (0.59) (0.60) (0.42) (0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35)
Vert.Alignment 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.64) (1.39) (1.56) (1.61) (1.49) (1.36) (1.48) (1.52)
Transfers * 1 Year Before 0.11∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(2.66) (3.13)
Transfers * Election -0.09∗ -0.04
(-1.90) (-1.13)
Transfers2 -1.06∗∗∗ -0.38∗
(-3.31) (-1.97)
Constant 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.48 0.73∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 0.75∗∗ 0.51
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (-0.68) (2.23) (2.04) (2.28) (1.42)
Observations 3047 3047 3047 3047 3052 3052 3052 3052
R2 0.957 0.958 0.957 0.957
No. of Instruments 32 32 32 32
Sargan p-val 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.10
Hansen J p-val 0.36 0.27 0.29 0.27
Robust clustered standard errors; P-Values in parentheses; Significance: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01
of local entities may lead to a decrease in the size of the public sector. At least for the
case of Poland, the opposite seems to be true. This result relies on the specific form of
competition present between the municipalities. Given that the municipalities finance their
activites relying on property management rather than local taxation, they do not involve in
tax competition, but rather competition in services: providing higher standards of services
above the legal minimums means improving the attractiveness of the municipality and can
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lead to increase in the value of property, which in turns decreases the dependence of the
municipality on central government transfers. This interpration suggests, that the transfers-
dependence variable might be endogenous to the ”attractiveness of the municipality”.
Throughout the sample we can observe evidence of electoral cycles. Total expenditure
raises on average by 5% one year before the election and by 3% in the election year1. One
year after the election the level of total expenditure drops by 4%. The positive effect of
transfers on expenditure is visible for the case of the (pre)election years. Figures 4 and 5
show the marginal effects of the increase in transfers in the (pre)election periods and outside
of them. There is no evidence that party effects play any role in determining the level of local
expenditure. Neither does incumbency advantage, education level of the mayor or turnout
at the election. The positive sign of the crisis variable reflects the fact that the expenditure
was constantly growing throughout the sample, and this time effect might not have been fully
captured by the trend variable and lagged dependent variables. It is important to remember
that although Poland suffered from the financial crisis, it did not experience negative growth
rates of GDP after 2009.
The main research question is exemplified in Figures 4 and 5. Inspection of Figures 4 and
5 reveals that increase in the transfers has a significant effect on the strength of the budget
cycle one year before the election but not in the election year itself. As mentioned, since the
regressions control for the level of expenditure, we can understand the results as an increase
in the deficit. Due to the relatively soft budget contraints, the deficit can be increased, and
higher dependence of external financing leads to a comparatively stronger increase in the
deficit financing one year before the election.
Results presented in Table 2 reveal that certain categories of expenditure are associated
with an increase in spending in the (pre)election periods, whereas we observe drops in others.
In particular there is a significant increase in spending on public administration, infrastruc-
ture and social policies as well as a slight increase in environmental protection expenditure
in the election periods, which seems to be compensated with a decrease in spending on edu-
1It is worth noticing that the elections are held in November.
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Figure 4: Marginal effects – one year before the election.
cation. The level of spending on infrastructure raises by an astonishing 23% one year before
the election and 28% in the election year. Infrastructure and adminsitrative spending rise
already one year before the election, most probably since these categories involve investments
that might need several months to be concluded, so the incumbent are likely to starting
increases in the expenditure early on. One year after the election we observe a significant
drop in expenditure on education and the environment. Increase in the public administration
expenditure could be a result of the mayor trying to influence the local bureaucrats by e.g.
affecting their wages. Infrastructure and social expenditure are associated with the highest
increases in the (pre)election period, which is consistent with the findings for other countries.
Expenditure on environmental protection is also a category of expenditure which is highly
17
Figure 5: Marginal effects – election year.
visible to the voters, and therefore increase in environmental expenditure is understandable.
Other political variables do not seem to affect the levels of local expenditure. Party effects
as well as the vertical alignment is not associated with higher expenditure. In particular,
unlike Veiga and Veiga (2007) we do not find evidence that mayor’s ideology is important
for expenditure levels, neither as total expenditure nor in specific categories. Education level
of the mayor as well as continuity of governance are also not explaining differences in the
expenditure levels. Turnout at the election does not correlate with total expenditure levels,
is however positively correlated with expenditure on education. This finding can be linked
to a empirical observation that well–educated citizens vote more frequently (see e.g. Gallego,
2010), thus can be an outcome of reverse causation. Infrastructure projects are associated
18
Figure 6: Transfers from the central government and expenditure.
with lower turnout, which might ba a sign that that more remote locations exhibit lower
turnout levels and at the same time higher need for infrastructure expenditure, thus the
effect is unllikely to be causal.
Adding the interaction terms to the regressions (Tables 3, 4 and 5) provides some addi-
tional insight. One year before the election increasing transfers from the central government
is associated with a higher expenditure on social support and environment. In the election
year itself, we do not observe a significant conditional effect of the transfers.
In particular analysis of the relation between transfers and different expenditure categories
in Figure 9 shows the impact of institutional setup and wealth of municipalities. In two
cases, of education and infrastructure we can observe clearly the nonlinearity, which we have
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Table 2: Expenditure categories
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Health Education Administration Infrastructure Social Environment
Revenue 0.20 -0.01 0.09 1.86∗∗∗ 0.27∗ 1.04∗∗∗
(0.86) (-0.19) (0.86) (8.14) (1.66) (4.85)
Lagged Revenue -0.10 0.00 0.06∗∗ -0.34∗∗ -0.04∗ -0.19
(-0.98) (0.09) (2.42) (-2.20) (-1.87) (-1.33)
Transfers -0.65 -0.12∗ 0.13 -1.08∗ -0.68∗ -0.19
(-0.86) (-1.95) (1.11) (-1.89) (-1.95) (-0.43)
PIT Revenue -0.89 -0.64∗∗∗ 0.25 1.20 0.16 0.12
(-1.60) (-4.57) (1.02) (1.45) (0.57) (0.15)
Public Debt -0.00 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗∗∗ -0.00 0.00∗∗∗
(-0.32) (5.58) (1.73) (5.56) (-0.48) (4.39)
1 Year Before 0.02 -0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.00 0.05∗
(0.83) (-2.87) (3.30) (7.54) (0.05) (1.82)
Election Year -0.01 -0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 0.28∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.06∗
(-0.41) (-3.13) (1.37) (6.63) (4.13) (1.69)
1 Year After -0.03 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.03 0.01 -0.10∗∗∗
(-1.60) (-7.87) (-3.10) (-0.95) (1.40) (-4.23)
Crisis 0.02 0.09∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.10 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05
(0.40) (8.00) (3.75) (1.51) (4.52) (0.93)
Pop Density 0.00 0.00 -0.00∗ -0.00∗ -0.00 0.00
(0.21) (0.43) (-1.85) (-1.68) (-0.93) (0.80)
Pop Under 18 1.05 0.04 0.27 9.16∗ 1.38∗∗ 0.30
(0.52) (0.05) (0.41) (1.85) (2.56) (0.08)
Pop Over 65 0.36 -1.52∗∗ 0.57 -13.27∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗ 7.80
(0.19) (-2.47) (0.83) (-2.75) (2.21) (1.64)
Unemployment -1.21∗ 0.16 -0.49 -1.49 0.56∗∗∗ -0.98
(-1.83) (0.78) (-1.34) (-1.09) (3.42) (-0.93)
Turnout -0.23 0.29∗∗∗ 0.00 -1.73∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗ -0.47
(-0.69) (3.11) (0.01) (-2.64) (2.10) (-0.85)
Education -0.17∗∗ -0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.00 -0.01
(-2.53) (-0.70) (-1.07) (0.42) (-0.12) (-0.07)
Incumbent 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.03
(0.57) (0.62) (0.46) (1.07) (-0.99) (-0.83)
PO 0.03 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.07
(0.67) (0.47) (-0.08) (-0.00) (-0.58) (0.91)
PiS 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.16∗∗ -0.07 0.05
(0.29) (0.92) (0.66) (2.09) (-1.42) (0.63)
SLD 0.02 0.01 0.03∗ -0.10 -0.01 -0.09
(0.59) (0.92) (1.66) (-1.05) (-0.53) (-0.91)
PSL 0.27∗ -0.01 0.04 0.12 -0.04 0.39∗
(1.71) (-0.30) (1.60) (0.37) (-1.37) (1.70)
Vert.Alignment 0.02 0.01∗∗ -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01
(0.84) (2.18) (-0.04) (0.04) (1.44) (-0.29)
L.Health 0.44∗∗∗
(6.44)
L2.Health 0.05
(1.64)
L.Education 0.31∗∗∗
(6.58)
L2.Education -0.07∗∗
(-2.12)
L.Administration 0.48∗∗∗
(6.81)
L2.Administration 0.01
(0.25)
L.Infrastructure 0.32∗∗∗
(8.55)
L2.Infrastructure 0.05∗
(1.79)
L.Social 0.09
(1.57)
L2.Social -0.05
(-1.62)
L.Environment 0.42∗∗∗
(9.70)
L2.Environment -0.05∗
(-1.71)
Constant 1.25 5.18∗∗∗ 1.52 -6.00∗∗ 3.66∗∗∗ -5.18∗
(1.08) (10.17) (1.16) (-2.43) (3.49) (-1.76)
N 3052 3052 3052 3049 2440 3052
No. of Instruments 32 27 27 27 32 27
Sargan p-val 0.27 0.16 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.09
Hansen J p-val 0.12 0.92 0.27 0.42 0.33 0.23
Robust clustered standard errors; P-Values in parentheses; Significance: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01
already identified for total expenditures. In education the educational subsidy is not sufficient
to cover all the necessary expenditures, thus municipalities must spend their own resources
cutting other expenditures. The nonlinearity confirms that richer municipalities, i.e. those
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Table 3: Expenditure categories - 1 year before the election
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Health Education Administration Infrastructure Social Environment
Revenue 0.21 -0.01 0.09 1.84∗∗∗ 0.27∗ 1.07∗∗∗
(0.90) (-0.14) (0.86) (8.04) (1.66) (4.93)
Lagged Revenue -0.10 0.00 0.06∗∗ -0.34∗∗ -0.04∗ -0.19
(-0.98) (0.09) (2.42) (-2.25) (-1.91) (-1.32)
Transfers -0.69 -0.13∗∗ 0.13 -1.01∗ -0.70∗∗ -0.29
(-0.90) (-2.04) (1.09) (-1.78) (-2.00) (-0.65)
PIT Revenue -0.88 -0.64∗∗∗ 0.25 1.18 0.12 0.15
(-1.59) (-4.55) (1.02) (1.42) (0.42) (0.19)
Public Debt -0.00 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗∗∗ -0.00 0.00∗∗∗
(-0.34) (5.57) (1.73) (5.67) (-0.54) (4.41)
1 Year Before -0.09 -0.04 0.02 0.49∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.26∗
(-0.93) (-1.50) (0.76) (2.56) (-2.63) (-1.66)
Election Year -0.01 -0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 0.28∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.06
(-0.44) (-3.11) (1.37) (6.68) (4.15) (1.61)
1 Year After -0.03 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.03 0.01 -0.10∗∗∗
(-1.60) (-7.87) (-3.10) (-0.98) (1.36) (-4.25)
Crisis 0.01 0.09∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.10 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05
(0.38) (7.98) (3.75) (1.50) (4.61) (0.88)
Pop Density 0.00 0.00 -0.00∗ -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.18) (0.43) (-1.85) (-1.64) (-0.89) (0.83)
Pop Under 18 1.01 0.04 0.27 9.22∗ 1.28∗∗ 0.06
(0.50) (0.05) (0.40) (1.87) (2.41) (0.02)
Pop Over 65 0.30 -1.52∗∗ 0.57 -13.15∗∗∗ 1.59∗∗ 7.46
(0.15) (-2.47) (0.84) (-2.71) (2.15) (1.60)
Unemployment -1.16∗ 0.17 -0.49 -1.60 0.59∗∗∗ -0.82
(-1.74) (0.83) (-1.33) (-1.16) (3.59) (-0.77)
Turnout -0.18 0.30∗∗∗ 0.00 -1.82∗∗∗ 0.28∗ -0.33
(-0.57) (3.15) (0.01) (-2.75) (1.89) (-0.58)
Education -0.16∗∗ -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.00 0.01
(-2.46) (-0.65) (-1.05) (0.33) (-0.06) (0.06)
Incumbent 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.03
(0.57) (0.61) (0.46) (1.08) (-1.05) (-0.83)
PO 0.03 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.07
(0.67) (0.46) (-0.08) (0.01) (-0.75) (0.89)
PiS 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.16∗∗ -0.07 0.05
(0.27) (0.91) (0.66) (2.09) (-1.47) (0.60)
SLD 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.11 -0.01 -0.08
(0.67) (0.96) (1.64) (-1.11) (-0.45) (-0.81)
PSL 0.27∗ -0.01 0.04 0.12 -0.03 0.38∗
(1.71) (-0.29) (1.60) (0.37) (-0.88) (1.70)
Vert. Alignment 0.02 0.01∗∗ -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01
(0.85) (2.21) (-0.06) (0.06) (1.33) (-0.34)
Transfers * 1 Year Before 0.17 0.04 0.00 -0.43 0.13∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗
(1.13) (0.89) (0.01) (-1.43) (2.68) (2.03)
L.Health 0.44∗∗∗
(6.46)
L2.Health 0.05∗
(1.65)
L.Education 0.31∗∗∗
(6.59)
L2.Education -0.07∗∗
(-2.10)
L.Administration 0.48∗∗∗
(6.85)
L2.Administration 0.01
(0.26)
L.Infrastructure 0.33∗∗∗
(8.50)
L2.Infrastructure 0.06∗
(1.86)
L.Social 0.09
(1.59)
L2.Social -0.04
(-1.53)
L.Environment 0.42∗∗∗
(9.69)
L2.Environment -0.05∗
(-1.84)
Constant 1.18 5.15∗∗∗ 1.52 -5.83∗∗ 3.71∗∗∗ -5.32∗
(1.00) (10.23) (1.16) (-2.35) (3.60) (-1.84)
Observations 3047 3047 3047 3044 2437 3047
No. of Instruments 34 29 29 29 34 29
Sargan p-val 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.31 0.22 0.02
Hansen J p-val 0.50 0.83 0.64 0.35 0.83 0.07
Robust clustered standard errors; P-Values in parentheses; Significance: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01
with lower share of transfers in total revenues, are able to supplement transfers with their
own resources, while municipalities with lower revenues and higher share of transfers in their
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Table 4: Expenditure categories - Election Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Health Education Administration Infrastructure Social Environment
Revenue 0.21 -0.01 0.09 1.86∗∗∗ 0.26∗ 1.01∗∗∗
(0.89) (-0.21) (0.84) (8.12) (1.67) (4.78)
Lagged Revenue -0.09 0.00 0.06∗∗ -0.34∗∗ -0.05∗ -0.22
(-0.91) (0.06) (2.33) (-2.23) (-1.92) (-1.56)
Transfers -0.71 -0.12∗ 0.14 -1.07∗ -0.66∗∗ -0.03
(-0.92) (-1.78) (1.21) (-1.79) (-1.98) (-0.07)
PIT Revenue -0.87 -0.64∗∗∗ 0.25 1.19 0.13 0.04
(-1.58) (-4.56) (1.00) (1.44) (0.49) (0.05)
Public Debt -0.00 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗∗∗ -0.00 0.00∗∗∗
(-0.33) (5.56) (1.74) (5.55) (-0.34) (4.54)
1 Year Before 0.01 -0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ -0.00 0.05∗∗
(0.76) (-2.88) (3.34) (7.63) (-0.11) (1.96)
Election Year -0.12 -0.01 0.03 0.31 0.09∗∗ 0.36∗∗
(-1.26) (-0.33) (1.57) (1.54) (2.25) (2.19)
1 Year After -0.03 -0.04∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.03 0.00 -0.11∗∗∗
(-1.52) (-7.69) (-3.17) (-0.95) (1.26) (-4.33)
Crisis 0.01 0.09∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.10 0.05∗∗∗ 0.07
(0.24) (8.02) (3.82) (1.57) (4.90) (1.19)
Pop Density 0.00 0.00 -0.00∗ -0.00∗ -0.00 0.00
(0.13) (0.44) (-1.80) (-1.68) (-1.02) (0.82)
Pop Under 18 1.12 0.03 0.26 9.13∗ 1.09∗∗ 0.01
(0.56) (0.04) (0.40) (1.83) (2.01) (0.00)
Pop Over 65 0.38 -1.52∗∗ 0.57 -13.29∗∗∗ 1.45∗ 7.69
(0.20) (-2.48) (0.83) (-2.74) (1.89) (1.62)
Unemployment -1.24∗ 0.17 -0.49 -1.48 0.53∗∗∗ -0.90
(-1.83) (0.82) (-1.33) (-1.08) (3.36) (-0.85)
Turnout -0.27 0.29∗∗∗ 0.02 -1.71∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗ -0.29
(-0.87) (3.07) (0.17) (-2.59) (1.99) (-0.51)
Education -0.17∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.00 0.01
(-2.62) (-0.65) (-0.99) (0.42) (-0.08) (0.06)
Incumbent 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.03
(0.56) (0.64) (0.49) (1.08) (-0.99) (-0.76)
PO 0.03 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.07
(0.69) (0.46) (-0.09) (-0.00) (-0.71) (0.92)
PiS 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.16∗∗ -0.07 0.05
(0.28) (0.92) (0.67) (2.10) (-1.43) (0.66)
SLD 0.02 0.01 0.03∗ -0.10 -0.01 -0.08
(0.51) (0.96) (1.71) (-1.04) (-0.45) (-0.80)
PSL 0.27∗ -0.01 0.04 0.12 -0.04 0.39∗
(1.70) (-0.29) (1.59) (0.37) (-1.12) (1.74)
Vert. Alignment 0.02 0.02∗∗ -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
(1.03) (2.29) (-0.08) (-0.11) (1.50) (-0.16)
Transfers * Election Year 0.18 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.10 -0.50∗
(1.32) (-0.40) (-1.24) (-0.17) (-1.54) (-1.89)
L.Health 0.44∗∗∗
(6.42)
L2.Health 0.05∗
(1.65)
L.Education 0.31∗∗∗
(6.52)
L2.Education -0.07∗∗
(-2.11)
L.Administration 0.48∗∗∗
(6.81)
L2.Administration 0.01
(0.26)
L.Infrastructure 0.32∗∗∗
(8.45)
L2.Infrastructure 0.05∗
(1.79)
L.Social 0.07
(1.32)
L2.Social -0.06∗∗
(-1.98)
L.Environment 0.42∗∗∗
(9.92)
L2.Environment -0.05∗
(-1.81)
Constant 1.17 5.17∗∗∗ 1.54 -5.97∗∗ 3.98∗∗∗ -4.90∗
(1.01) (10.22) (1.17) (-2.41) (4.02) (-1.70)
Observations 3047 3047 3047 3044 2437 3047
No. of Instruments 34 29 29 29 34 29
Sargan p-val 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.31 0.22 0.02
Hansen J p-val 0.50 0.83 0.64 0.35 0.83 0.07
Robust clustered standard errors; P-Values in parentheses; Significance: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01
revenues are not able to do it and must reduce their expenditures on education. Similarly with
infrastructure: poorer municipalities, i.e. those with lower fiscal autonomy, were spending
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Table 5: Expenditure categories - A non–linear specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Health Education Administration Infrastructure Social Environment
Revenue 0.21 0.01 0.07 1.97∗∗∗ 0.27∗ 1.10∗∗∗
(0.89) (0.29) (0.66) (8.39) (1.68) (5.04)
Lagged Revenue -0.10 0.00 0.06∗∗ -0.34∗∗ -0.04∗ -0.20
(-0.98) (0.02) (2.50) (-2.25) (-1.89) (-1.35)
Transfers -0.27 0.58∗∗ -0.50∗ 2.61 -0.42 2.09
(-0.27) (2.27) (-1.66) (1.45) (-0.62) (1.17)
PIT Revenue -0.90 -0.67∗∗∗ 0.28 1.07 0.15 0.04
(-1.61) (-4.69) (1.19) (1.30) (0.50) (0.05)
Public Debt -0.00 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗∗∗ -0.00 0.00∗∗∗
(-0.31) (5.70) (1.74) (5.48) (-0.44) (4.51)
1 Year Before 0.02 -0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ -0.00 0.04∗
(0.79) (-3.10) (3.34) (7.47) (-0.05) (1.66)
Election Year -0.01 -0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 0.27∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.06∗
(-0.41) (-3.24) (1.42) (6.63) (4.04) (1.65)
1 Year After -0.03 -0.04∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.03 0.01 -0.10∗∗∗
(-1.60) (-7.95) (-3.03) (-0.96) (1.35) (-4.25)
Crisis 0.02 0.09∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.11∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.06
(0.42) (8.12) (3.71) (1.68) (4.56) (1.01)
Pop Density 0.00 0.00 -0.00∗ -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.23) (0.66) (-1.93) (-1.60) (-0.90) (0.83)
Pop Under 18 1.13 0.16 0.21 9.43∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 0.50
(0.56) (0.19) (0.31) (1.90) (2.74) (0.13)
Pop Over 65 0.43 -1.49∗∗ 0.56 -13.42∗∗∗ 1.64∗∗ 7.86∗
(0.22) (-2.42) (0.81) (-2.79) (2.22) (1.65)
Unemployment -1.21∗ 0.16 -0.49 -1.48 0.55∗∗∗ -0.98
(-1.83) (0.71) (-1.35) (-1.09) (3.38) (-0.93)
Turnout -0.23 0.28∗∗∗ 0.01 -1.77∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗ -0.51
(-0.70) (3.00) (0.06) (-2.72) (2.09) (-0.90)
Education -0.17∗∗ -0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.00 -0.01
(-2.53) (-0.75) (-1.01) (0.38) (-0.13) (-0.11)
Incumbent 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.03
(0.57) (0.61) (0.48) (1.05) (-0.99) (-0.84)
PO 0.03 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.07
(0.67) (0.47) (-0.08) (0.02) (-0.59) (0.90)
PiS 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.16∗∗ -0.07 0.05
(0.28) (0.90) (0.69) (2.06) (-1.40) (0.60)
SLD 0.02 0.01 0.03∗ -0.10 -0.01 -0.09
(0.59) (0.93) (1.69) (-1.06) (-0.51) (-0.94)
PSL 0.27∗ -0.01 0.04∗ 0.10 -0.05 0.37
(1.71) (-0.44) (1.75) (0.30) (-1.51) (1.62)
Vert. Alignment 0.02 0.01∗∗ -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.98) (2.24) (-0.04) (-0.13) (1.30) (-0.13)
Transfers2 -0.36 -0.66∗∗∗ 0.59 -3.45∗∗ -0.24 -2.13
(-0.47) (-2.85) (1.62) (-2.25) (-0.47) (-1.43)
L.Health 0.44∗∗∗
(6.45)
L2.Health 0.05∗
(1.65)
L.Education 0.31∗∗∗
(6.64)
L2.Education -0.07∗∗
(-2.04)
L.Administration 0.49∗∗∗
(7.27)
L2.Administration 0.01
(0.31)
L.Infrastructure 0.32∗∗∗
(8.59)
L2.Infrastructure 0.05∗
(1.71)
L.Social 0.08
(1.47)
L2.Social -0.05
(-1.63)
L.Environment 0.42∗∗∗
(9.67)
L2.Environment -0.05∗
(-1.71)
Constant 1.03 4.81∗∗∗ 1.77 -7.68∗∗∗ 3.58∗∗∗ -6.27∗∗
(0.83) (9.53) (1.27) (-2.86) (3.33) (-2.06)
Observations 3047 3047 3047 3044 2437 3047
No. of Instruments 34 29 29 29 34 29
Sargan p-val 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.31 0.22 0.02
Hansen J p-val 0.50 0.83 0.64 0.35 0.83 0.07
Robust clustered standard errors; P-Values in parentheses; Significance: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01
less on infrastructure, not being able to mobilize enough resources for new investments.
The expenditures on administration are increasing with the level of transfers from the
23
higher levels of government, since municipalities have to implement the tasks delegated to
them and for this they need relatively more people and resources. However, this increase is
not significant. Also for environment the expenditures are increasing slightly with transfers,
what probably can be associated with EU funds for environmental investment, but, since most
municipalities are able to apply for these funds the differences are not big. Social expenditures
are falling with transfers, with more autonomous municipalities spending some of their own
resources in this field, building apartments for the poor or funding meals for school children.
Nevertheless, most social expenditures are financed by transfers from the central government.
Finally, the effect of transfers on health expenditures is negligible, since health is mostly
within responsibility of counties, not municipalities.
We propose additional robustness checks for our results. In the first check which at the
same time allows us to further analyze expenditure behavior outside of election periods we
created a set of artificial elections in the years 2004, 2008 and 2012, therefore exactly in the
middle of the electoral period. In the second check, which is the main falsification test, we
have created a random indicator variable which for each municipality produces a randomly
located electoral cycle. Results present in Table 7 in the Appendix show that in the years
2004, 2008 and 2012, thus in the middle of the period in office of the mayors, the expenditure
drops even further. The evidence can be summarized as follows: we observe a sharp increase
in the expenditure one year before and in the election year followed by a sharp drop one and
two years after the election.
As an additional robustness check we propose a falsification test. Table 8 in the Appendix
presents the results. Coefficients of the variables identified in the literature as having impact
on local expenditure keep their signs and significance, whereas the false electoral cycle does
not have any impact on the level of expenditure. These results further suggest that the
existence of electoral cycles in our data is not a mere coincidence.
5. Conclusions
This work looked at the effects of fiscal autonomy on the political budget cycle. We found
that higher levels of central funding of municipalities is associated with a stronger budget
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Figure 7: Marginal effects – One year before the election
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Figure 8: Marginal effects – Election year
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Figure 9: Transfers and Expenditure Categories
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cycle. This findings add to the discussion of the effects of fiscal autonomy on government
size. Not only fiscal decentralization may reduce the size of the government, but also makes it
less likely for politicians to affect the budgets in election periods. This is an important argu-
ment, which additionally shows that fiscal autonomy can lead to more efficient use of public
resources. Moreover, we find that in the Polish institutional set–up, higher dependence of
central funding is not associated with lower expenditure in the municipalities. This finding is
linked to the fact, that the main source of funding other than transfers is property manage-
ment. Instead of involving in tax competition, Polish muncipalities involve in competition in
quality, by increasing provision of local services above the minimum provision standards. This
is hypothesised to lead to an increase in the attractiveness of the municipalities and in turn
positively affect the value of public property and decrease dependence on central funding.
Within this study we cannot test the latter hypothesis directly, but this interesting empirical
observation will be pursued in future research.
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Appendix
Table 6: Summary statistics
No. of Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Total Expenditure 3664 2622.513 1334.261 972.05 42739.14
Health 3664 31.4697 44.07571 1.195099 1530.459
Education 3664 859.233 322.0114 282.1004 3013.129
Administration 3664 254.578 143.7223 91.48753 2620.752
Infrastructure 3664 281.7521 356.2384 0 7763.141
Social 3053 453.9098 158.3657 108.5428 3174.461
Environment 3664 250.0596 426.7444 17.19618 14178.99
PIT Revenue 3664 .2003997 .0692873 .0068974 .5842756
Public Debt 3058 786.8987 617.2475 0 4610.336
Transfers 3664 .5937042 .1135899 .0048334 .9598033
Unemployment 3359 .0997827 .042939 .01 .32
Pop Density 3664 1238.809 774.9065 12 4256
Pop Size 3664 61793.62 134446.1 1318 1724404
Pop Under 18 3664 .1920223 .0258299 .1199905 .2842254
Pop Over 65 3664 .1593297 .0280393 .0642798 .2753344
Turnout 3666 .4406257 .0825475 .2027434 .7239465
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Table 7: Behavior of expenditure in years 2004, 2008 and 2012
(1) (2)
Sys GMM FE
L.Expenditure 0.37∗∗∗
(11.25)
L2.Expenditure 0.05∗∗
(2.81)
Revenue 0.74∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗
(33.19) (24.37)
Lagged Revenue -0.12∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(-3.67) (5.48)
Public Debt 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
(18.79) (9.71)
Transfers -0.33∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗
(-5.91) (-2.79)
PIT Revenue 0.00 -0.00
(1.69) (-1.68)
1 Year Before -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗
(-13.06) (-14.84)
Election Year -0.02∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗
(-3.97) (-11.94)
1 Year After 0.01∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(2.34) (-6.15)
Crisis 0.05∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(5.29) (9.05)
Pop Density 0.00 0.00
(1.36) (1.45)
Pop Under 18 -0.18 -0.42
(-0.31) (-1.31)
Pop Over 65 -3.22∗∗∗ -1.23∗∗
(-5.39) (-3.22)
Unemployment -0.54∗∗ 0.27∗
(-3.17) (2.19)
Turnout 0.07 0.05
(0.76) (0.86)
Education Level -0.01 0.00
(-0.53) (0.28)
Incumbent -0.00 -0.00
(-0.20) (-0.26)
PO -0.00 0.01
(-0.02) (1.43)
PiS 0.02 0.00
(1.27) (0.53)
SLD -0.02 0.00
(-1.44) (0.45)
PSL 0.03 0.01
(0.93) (0.42)
Const. 0.37 0.50∗
(1.20) (2.17)
N 3052 3052
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Table 8: Falsification Test – Random Elections
(1) (2)
Sys GMM FE
L.Expenditure 0.24∗∗∗
(8.10)
L2.Expenditure -0.02
(-1.33)
Revenue 0.73∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗
(33.91) (24.78)
Lagged Revenue -0.00 0.15∗∗∗
(-0.14) (5.88)
Public Debt 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
(17.34) (9.03)
Transfers -0.36∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗
(-6.67) (-4.07)
PIT Revenue 0.00 -0.00∗∗
(0.07) (-3.02)
1 Year Before 0.00 -0.00
(0.06) (-0.47)
Election Year 0.01 0.00
(0.76) (0.78)
1 Year After -0.01 -0.00
(-0.88) (-0.19)
Crisis -0.00 0.01
(-0.03) (1.51)
Pop Density 0.00 0.00
(0.39) (1.03)
Pop Under 18 -0.14 -0.86∗∗
(-0.26) (-2.80)
Pop Over 65 -5.98∗∗∗ -2.05∗∗∗
(-11.56) (-5.28)
Unemployment -0.31∗ 0.03
(-1.97) (0.27)
Turnout -0.10 0.10
(-1.20) (1.91)
Education Level -0.01 0.00
(-0.78) (0.26)
Incumbent -0.01 0.01
(-0.99) (1.32)
PO -0.01 0.01
(-0.76) (1.88)
PiS 0.01 0.01
(0.97) (0.78)
SLD -0.02 0.00
(-1.20) (0.39)
PSL 0.04 0.01
(1.12) (0.43)
Const. 1.48∗∗∗ 0.48∗
(5.22) (2.16)
N 3052 3052
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